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Myth or Reality? 
IN APRIL, 1951, the conservative Wall Street Journal 
declared: "Unfortunately, the tactic of the manu- 
factured crisis has been used so often that neither 
Congress nor the people know what they can be- 
lieve." The fact is, of course, that the Truman 
Administration, in order to push its enormous arma- 
ments program through Congress and to justify the 
continuation of the cold war and the Far Eastern 
crisis, feels compelled to resort to the device of 
keeping the American people stirred up and fearful 
over some alleged menace of Soviet or Communist 
origin. 
The manufactured crisis depends on the manu- 
factured myth. And of all the myths conjured up 
by the anti-Soviet forces of the United States and 
the Western World, the most far-fetched and far- 
reaching is that the Soviet Union is bent on military 
aggression. The underlying premise of the North 
Atlantic Pact is that Soviet armies will invade and 
over-run Western Europe if they get the opportu- 
nity. The same premise lies behind the colossal 
expenditures on armaments of the American Gov- 
ernment and was an integral part of President Tru- 
man's recent message calling for an armaments 
budget of more than 60 billion dollars for 1951-52. 
Building up the bogey of Soviet aggression has 
been a remarkably convenient and successful means 
of producing in America an atmosphere of hysteria 
and fear. I am convinced that this anti-Soviet 
propaganda is false and dangerous, and as harmful 
to the establishment of world peace as to the main- 
tenance of American democracy. Assuming the 
Soviet Government realizes that a third world war 
would in all probability follow if it attacked any 
country anywhere, I see at least twenty reasons why 
Soviet military aggression is most unlikely, either 
now or in the future: 
First, the Soviet Russians, remembering poign- 
antly their terrible losses in property and human 
- life during the First and Second World Wars, and 
especially in Hitler's cruel and destructive invasion, 
are utterly opposed, from the viewpoint of simple 
self-preservation and national well-being, to under- 
going a third and perhaps even worse ordeal in an 
international conflict involving use of the atom 
bomb. 
Second, the Soviet Russians wish above all to go 
on with their reconstruction of the devastated areas 
and the building of Socialism, and not to have this 
program set back for years through an all-out war. 
Third, repeated and reliable reports from Soviet 
Russia during the period of the Fourth Five-Year 
Plan, 1946-50, indicate that the Soviet people are 
in fact preoccupied with tremendous projects of 
peaceful economic construction and that their minds 
are not dwelling upon dreams of military conquest. 
The Five-Year Plan recently completed attained 
most of its main social and economic goals. Instead 
of a serious inflation due to disproportionate war 
preparations, as in the United States, the Soviet 
Union has put through four general price reductions 
of a sweeping nature since the close of the war. The 
last of these occurred in March, 1951, and lowered 
prices on a multitude of consumer goods from ten 
to thirty percent. 
Fourth, the Soviet Union, stretching over two 
continents and larger than all North America, pos- 
sesses within its vast domains practically all the raw 
materials necessary for its economy. It needs no 
new territories to provide it with natural resources. 
The U.S.S.R., however, is glad to supplement its 
own basic wealth through doing business with other 
countries and at present has particularly active trade 
relations with the People's Republic of China and 
the nations of Eastern Europe. 
Fifth, the huge size of Soviet Russia, together 
with its material riches and economic development, 
means that it has plenty of room for its expanding 
population. Over-population, which has often been 
a spur to military conquest, is not a problem in the 
Soviet Union. 
Sixth, the public ownership of the main means of 
production and distribution in the U.S.S.R. prevents 
private individuals and groups from profiting finan- 
cially from armaments or any other war activity. 
' Seventh, although in the current disordered and 
threatening state of the world the Soviet Republic 
must maintain an m y  and armaments for defense, 
it stands as always for disarmament agreements be- 
tween the different nations and has repeatedly made 
concrete proposals towards this end, both in the 
United Nations and elsewhere. The Soviet people 
regard armaments as a necessary evil during the 
transition to enduring peace; and they do not in the 
slightest require them as a stimulus to economic 
prosperity. 
Eighth, the Soviet plan calling for the destruction 
of all atom bombs, manufactured by whatever coun- 
try, and for effective international supervision of 
atomic energy demonstrates its own wish and in- 
tention to use its atomic resources for peaceful puq- 
poses and the further economic upbuilding of the 
nation. 
Ninth, Soviet Russia's economic system of social- 
ist planning, having overcome the great economic 
depressions, famines and periods of mass unemploy- 
ment so characteristic of the past, makes altogether 
needless and irrelevant the classic method of rnili- 
tary adventure as a way of temporarily submerging 
internal crises and sidetracking the revolutionary 
discontent of the population, Furthermore, since 
the Soviet people always have the purchasing power 
to buy back the goods which they produce, there is 
no overwhelming pressure to acquire foreign mar- 
kets and spheres of influence for getting rid of sur- 
plus products. In brief, what I am suggesting here 
is that the Soviet Russians have eliminated, so far 
as their own country is concerned, the chief eco- 
nomic roots of war-making and war-mongering. 
Tenth, the Soviet Union, despite its relative self- 
sufficiency in an economic sense, desires normal 
international trade with the other nations of the 
earth. It has ever sought to establish good business 
relations with the United States and Western Eu- 
rope, exchanging raw materials for machinery and 
finished goods. The Soviet Russians infinitely prefer 
peaceful and mutually advantageous commerce 
with the West to war. 
Eleventh, in line with the last point, the Soviet 
Government has repeatedly stressed the possibility 
and the common sense of the capitalist and socialist 
nations of the world peacefully co-existing and co- 
operating on limited but important international 
ends. The Soviet Russians remain militantly op- 
posed to the capitalist economic system and mili- 
tantly in favor of their own; but they believe that 
war between the capitalist and socialist systems, 
especially in this era of atom bombs and other 
weapons of fearful destructiveness, may well prove 
ruinous to both. Although some Marxist and Soviet 
theoreticians have occasionally talked loosely and 
grandiloquently about the "inevitability" of war as 
long as capitalism exists, Soviet foreign policy actu- 
ally rejects this idea. Premier Stalin himself denied 
the inevitability of a new world war only as recently 
as February, 1951. 
Twelfth, while the Soviet Russians clearly wish to 
see world socialism established, they do not favor 
trying to extend Communist principles to other lands 
through the means of armed invasion. The Soviets 
support the thesis that "Revolution cannot be ex- 
ported," but must be the outcome of indigenous 
radical movements in whatever country is con- 
cerned. They gave moral encouragement, to be 
sure, to the recently successful Communist revolu- 
tion in China, but neither material nor military aid. 
Marxist theory claims that capitalism will eventually 
collapse in every nation through its own inner con- 
tradictions and the pressure of the working class. 
The Soviet Russians take this theory very seriously 
and find it pointless to assume the terrific burdens 
and dangers of war in order to spread socialism 
when they are convinced that this new system is 
bound to come in due course anyway. 
Thirteenth, the idea of military aggression and 
international war, except in legitimate self-defense, 
is contrary to the mainstream of Marxist and Soviet 
doctrine, from Karl Marx down to the present time. 
In the tense days of 1939, when the Second World 
War had already broken out, the Soviet Union went 
to war against Finland in order to re-adjust the 
frontiers for better defense against the Nazi men- 
ace. I think this was a mistake, but at least it was 
understandable in view of the critical international 
situation and of Hitler's later invasion of the U.S.S.R. 
hand in hand with the Finns. 
Whatever opinions one may hold concerning the 
origin of the struggle in Korea in the summer of 
1950, there is no evidence that Soviet Russia was 
responsible. Certainly it has not intervened in the 
conflict to offset the cruel and devastating interven- 
tion of the United States and the United Nations. 
Undoubtedly the Communists of the East consid- 
ered the North Korean action justified as part of an 
inevitable civil war and as a defensive measure to 
eliminate the American military bridgehead on the 
continent of Asia. 
Fourteenth, despite the fact that the Soviet Union 
possesses mighty armies and air fleets, no responsi- 
ble leader in its governmental, military, economic, 
journalistic or cultural affairs has once made the sug- 
gestion during the troubled years since World War 
I1 that it should initiate a preventive war or bomb 
a foreign country. This record compares very fa- 
vorably with the statements by many leading public 
figures in the United States, some of them govern- 
ment officials, that America should launch an atom- 
bomb assault on Soviet Russia; and with the fre- 
quent publication in the American press of detailed 
blueprints for such an attack, pointing out on maps 
the precise cities and industrial areas in the U.S.S.R. 
which are to be knocked out. 
Fifteenth, indicating the basic Soviet attitude 
toward war, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., cor- 
responding in its political functions to the United 
States Congress, passed in March, 1951, a law mak- 
ing any kind of war propaganda illegal in the Soviet 
Republic. The maximum penalty under this new 
law is twenty-five years in jail. 
Sixteenth, the Soviet Government has made no 
concrete military moves in any part of the world 
indicating aggressive intentions against any country. 
On the other hand, the Soviet Union carried out ex- 
tensive demobilization of its armies during 1945, 
1946 and 1947. The continual rumors of threaten- 
ing Soviet troop movements have never turned out 
to have a basis in fact. A recent dispatch in the Chi- 
cago Daily News from William Stoneman in Paris 
stated: "A wave of resentment swept Paris as the 
result of what newspapers hint is a deliberate at- 
tempt by the American Government to alarm the 
public on Soviet troop concentrations." Of course, 
regular army maneuvers take place from time to 
time in the U.S.S.R., as in other nations. 
Seventeenth, if the Soviet Government were really 
plotting military aggression against, for example, 
Western Europe, it would presumably have started 
the war before the rearmament of the Atlantic Pow- 
ers had made such headway and at a time, such as 
the fall of 1950, when the American military forces 
were preoccupied in the Far East. 
Eighteenth, Joseph Stalin, Premier of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, having successfully 
seen his country through to the establishment of the 
first socialist commonwealth in history' and having 
led the Soviet people to victory in the Second World 
War, would in all likelihood prefer to enhance his 
reputation as a statesman by helping to ensure an 
era of peace for the U.S.S.R. and mankind. Surely 
he has no desire to go down in history, like Adolf 
Hitler, as a notorious leader of military aggression 
and as one of the most infamous war criminals of all 
time. 
Nineteenth, if we review the history of Soviet for- 
eign policy from the birth of the Soviet Republic in 
1917 down to the outbreak of World War 11, we find 
a continuous and consistent record on behalf of 
international peace and understanding. In the early 
years Lenin as head of the Soviet state did his best 
to achieve peaceful relations with the other coun- 
tries of the earth, a number of which attempted to 
effect the downfall of the Communist regime 
through armed intervention. In the later period 
the Soviet Union, with Maxim Litvinov as its able 
and eloquent Foreign Minister, joined the League 
of Nations and tried to the utmost to build an effec- 
tive system of collective security with the Western 
democracies against Fascist aggression. Clearly, it 
was not Soviet Russia's fault that the League failed 
to follow out the commitments of its own Covenant 
and thus stop Hitler and Mussolini. 
Twentieth, during the period of current history 
since the triumph of the allied nations over the 
Axis Powers, Soviet Russia, in consonance with its 
past record, has steadfastly striven for international 
peace and reasonable agreements with the United 
States. Since 1945 the Soviet Union has made its 
own share of serious mistakes in foreign policy, 
mostly of a tactical nature, and has at times acted 
in an arbitrary, brusque and obdurate manner. But 
on the whole over the past six years it has shown a 
willingness to compromise for the sake of world 
amity and a desire to make the United Nations a 
successfully functioning organization. Soviet leaders 
have given voice again and again to the theme of 
peaceful co-existence between the socialist and cap- 
italist blocs; and have repeatedly proposed a top- 
level conference between the U.S.S.R. and the 
U.S.A. for the purpose of ironing out the main dif- 
ficulties between these two great countries and 
reaching some sort of over-all settlement. 
The Truman Administration has frowned upon 
such a conference and settlement, having built up 
a spurious identification between peace and ap- 
peasement. This untenable position is, again, 
based on the assumption that Soviet Russia harbors 
aggressive military designs. I believe that the 
United States can and should reach a peaceful - 
agreement with the Soviet Government on honor- 
able and mutually advantageous terms. 
In these twenty points I have sought to sum up 
briefly the chief reasons why I think Soviet military 
aggression will not take place. Of course the Soviet 
Union will fight back if attacked and could be forced 
into some sort of defensive action if it felt directly 
menaced, for instance, by a rearmed, neo-Nazi Ger- 
many or if it were convinced that a general war 
was about to be unleashed against it. I could be 
wrong, but this is the way the international picture 
looks to me. 
Additional copies of this pamphlet may be obtained 
at 3c per copy from the author at 450 fiiverside 
Drive, New York 27, N. Y .  
